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I.

INTRODUCTION

Awards of punitive damages in personal injury and property damage
cases are claimed to be excessive, lacking in due process, and detrimental to
the economic well-being of commercial enterprise.' Fear of these awards
reportedly causes firms to withdraw goods and services from the market and
chills their efforts to develop and introduce new or improved products and
services.2 Though studies show that punitive damage awards are not as
common as generally thought,3 perceptions that the threat of such damages

*Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of North Texas, J.D. Southern Methodist
University.
**Associate Professor of Business Law, University of North Texas, J.D. University of
Texas at Austin, College of Business Administration, Department of Finance, Insurance, Real
Estate & Law.
***Associate Professor of Business Law, University of North Texas, J.D. University of
Texas at Austin.
1.See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American Law Institute's
Reporters' Study on Enterprise Responsibilityfor PersonalInjury: A Timely Callfor Punitive
Damages Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 263, 264-65 (1993) (sources cited therein).
2. Id. at 265.
3. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data,78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 23 (1992).
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is growing continue to drive reform efforts aimed at limiting them. Both
legislative and judicial endeavors are underway to better articulate the process
for determining punitive damages, including limiting amounts that may be
claimed and awarded.'
Traditionally, punitive damages law permitted a court to assess punitive
damages to punish individual defendants and to deter them and others from
engaging in egregious conduct in the future.' Today, in contrast, punitive
damages are often imposed against enterprises that are typically comprised
of a vast array of individual employees. Such enterprises, however, may or
may not respond to the same economic incentives as individuals, because an
individual's goals may or may not be consistent with those of the enterprise.
Further, the structure and decision-making process of the enterprise may not
be consistent with identifying inappropriate behavior. The effectiveness of
coercing firms to pay large damages assessments as a deterrent to inappropriate behavior, whether in the nature of a criminal fine or a civil damage
award, continues to be a topic of much debate.'
As described by George Priest, the expansion of liability irrespective of
fault, intended to benefit consumers and other plaintiffs who might otherwise
be left financially destitute, has increased prices and reduced availability of
goods and services for those consumers who can least afford to pay for
them.' The liability crisis has not resulted solely from the evolution of strict
liability; however, this evolution, coupled with reductions in insurance
coverage' and greater levels of third-party insurance for prospective
victims,9 has exacerbated the crisis.'" While some commentators anticipated
increased opportunities for plaintiffs because of increased liability," these
additional opportunities have not materialized. Third-party insurance poses
problems due to liability for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Risks
are effectively uninsurable because the losses do not result from probabilistic

4. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A Proposed
Alternative, 20 J. LEGIs. 191, 195-97 (1994) (discussing various state statutes that limit the
assessment of punitive damages).
5. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products,49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1982). For a discussion of the general principles
of punitive damages law, see id. at 7-10.
6. See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
7. See George L. Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1525, 1567.
8. Id. at 1525.
9. Id. at 1567.
10. Id. at 1524, 1563.
11. See id. at 1525, 1567.
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causes, and the "variance of risks has been so expanded by tort liability that
the risk pools are unsupportable. 1 2
The purposes of this paper are (1) to examine the debate over the
propriety of assessing punitive damages to punish and deter egregious
corporate conduct and (2) to propose an alternative approach for dealing with
egregious conduct. After tracing the history and development of the current

punitive damages process and exploring the recent constitutional challenges
to punitive damages awards, the paper discusses the effectiveness of punitive
damages in modifying egregious firm behavior. Next, the paper reviews
various proposals that have been made to reform the current process. Finally,
the paper concludes by outlining an alternative remedy: court-imposed
compliance programs. As discussed below, compliance programs are likely
to be more beneficial than punitive damages in two respects. First, such
programs offer the opportunity to create organizational structures that will
modify the behavior of the company found to have engaged in wrongful
conduct. Second, they serve as models that other organizations can follow to
minimize the incidence of their own inappropriate behavior.
II.

HISTORY

The doctrine of punitive damages can be traced back at least as far as
2000 B.C. to the Code of Hammurabi.' 3 Both the Old Testament' 4 and
Roman Law'" provide for multiple damage awards. In eighteenth-century
England, courts initially awarded punitive damages in jury cases involving
claims of slander, assault and battery, illegal intrusion into private dwellings,
and false imprisonment, all of which concerned affronts to the plaintiffs
honor.' 6 Attempts to provide a rationale for allegedly excessive awards by
juries led to explanations that punitive damages not only compensated the
plaintiff but also served to punish and deter wrongdoing by the defendant and
others. 7 Courts also theorized that awarding punitive damages would reduce
the plaintiff's desire for either obtaining revenge or resorting to self-help.'"

12. Id. at 1583.
13. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv.
1257, 1262 n.17 (1976); see id. at 1262-64 (discussing the origins of the punitive damages

doctrine and its development in the United States).
14. Id. at 1262 n.17 (citing Exodus 22:1).

15. Id. at 1262-63 n.17 ("[S]everal provisions in classical Roman law prescribed double,
treble, and quadruple damages.").
16. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law ofPunitive Damages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1982).

17. Id. at 14 (citing Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763)).
18. See Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search
of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 746 (1989).
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Two cases decided as early as 1763, Wilkes v. Wood 9 and Huckle v.
Money,2 ° illustrate the courts' desire to avoid the possibility of vigilante
justice. In Wilkes, the plaintiff initiated a trespass action against agents of the
Secretary of State for illegal searches and seizures under general warrants.2'
The court announced that the jury had the power to award damages in excess
of the injury sustained. As Lord Chief Justice Pratt stated, "Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future,
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."22
Early common law cases challenged the jury's role in determining
punitive damages; however, in most instances, the courts gave great deference
to the discretion of the jury.' Perhaps the first American case in which the
United States Supreme Court considered the right of a jury to award punitive
damages is Day v. Woodworth.24 In Day the Court observed:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that.., a
jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his
offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff....
By the common law as well as by statute law, men are often
punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a
civil action, and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or
punishment, given to the party injured.
. .. [The determination of punitive damages] has been always
left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be
thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each
2
case.

S

In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith, 26 a late nineteenth
century opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that jury awards of punitive
damages did not amount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law because they were an appropriate means of imposing a penalty that had
been recognized for more than a century.27 As discussed in the following

19. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
20. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
21. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489-90.
22. Id. at 498-99.
23. See Ellis, supra note 16, at 12-14 (discussing the courts' concerns with overriding jury
discretion to determine damage awards).
24. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
25. Id. at 371.

26. 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
27. Id. at 36.
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section, many concerns with the jury's role in determining punitive damages
have involved constitutional issues similar to those considered by the Beckwith
Court.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The punitive damages process is often challenged as being fundamentally
unfair and hence a denial of due process because it allows juries broad
discretion to determine punitive damages based on vague standards and leads
to unpredictable results. 8 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has affirmed the
jury's authority to determine punitive damages, reasoning that the courts'
power to review these awards is adequate protection against abuse of jury
discretion or other due process violations.29 However, recent Supreme Court

decisions still show some concern with the broad discretion afforded to juries,
although these decisions find that broad discretion is insufficient grounds for
a due process violation. For example, in the 1991 case of PacificMutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court upheld an Alabama jury award that was
four times the amount of compensatory damages.30 Although the common law
practice of assessing punitive damages was well-established long before the
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the Court observed that even a practice
that has been recognized for so long does not mean that its use is never
unconstitutional.3" Although agreeing that the award in the instant case did
not "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety,"32 the majority
expressed concerns about punitive damage awards that "run wild." 33 The
Court stated that it could not draw "a mathematical bright line" to distinguish
between what is and what is not constitutionally acceptable for every factual
situation;34 instead, the Court limited the proper inquiry to "general concerns
and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried
of reasonableness
" 35
jury.
a
to

28. See Owen, supra note 5, at 9; Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for
Reforming Punitive DamagesProcedures, 69 VA. L. RaV. 269 (1983). The authority of courts
to impose punitive damage awards has also been challenged on other constitutional grounds.
In Browning-FerrisIndustries v. Kelco Disposal,Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989), the Supreme
Court ruled that the "Excessive Fines Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] does not apply to
punitive damage awards in cases between private parties."
29. See infra notes 30-49 and cases cited therein.
30. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991).
31. Id. at 17-18.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id. at 18.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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In the 1993 case of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., the Court revealed similar concerns with due process, as well as the
diversity of thinking among the justices on the propriety of jury-awarded
punitive damages. In applying the Haslip reasonableness test to uphold a West
Virginia jury's punitive damage award that exceeded five hundred times the
amount of actual damages, the Court affirmed that the broad discretion
afforded juries to determine punitive damages does not violate due process."
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Kennedy worried that "we are still
bereft of any standard by which to compare the punishment to the malefaction
that gave rise to it."38 He also noted that "[t]he Constitution identifies no
particular multiple of compensatory damages as an acceptable limit for
punitive awards; it does not concern itself with dollar amounts, ratios, or the
quirks of juries in specific jurisdictions." 39 Instead, the only fundamental
Constitutional guarantee that could serve as a limit on punitive damage awards
"is that the individual citizen may rest secure against arbitrary or irrational
deprivation of property. "'
In 1994, the Court revisited the punitive damages doctrine once again in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.41 In this case, the Court held that the state's
denial of judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.42 Noting that the broad discretion granted to
juries in assessing punitive damages raised dangers of "arbitrary deprivation
of property,"' the Court held that procedural safeguards such as judicial
review were necessary to ensure adequate due process protection against
potential abuse of discretion in making punitive damage awards."
In the most recent punitive damages case, BMW of North America v.
Gore,45 the Court held that an award of punitive damages which was five
hundred times the amount of the plaintiff's actual property damage violated the
defendant's due process rights. 46 Gore is significant because, for the first
time, the Court set forth guidelines for determining the reasonableness of
punitive damage awards challenged as excessive. The Court stated that to
reduce the likelihood of excessive damages awards, juries considering an

36. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
37. Id. at 462 (noting that the "dramatic disparity between the actual damages and the
punitive award [is not] controlling in a case of this character").
38. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 467.
40. Id.
41. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
42. Id. at 432, 434-35.
43. Id. at 432.
44. Id.
45. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
46. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996).
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award of punitive damages might be instructed to examine three criteria: (1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, (2) the disparity
between the harm to the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages awarded,
and (3) the difference between punitive damages and civil penalties authorized
for comparable misconduct.47 These guidelines do not provide a formula for
calculating the amount of punitive damages; rather, they appear to provide
direction to lower courts without unduly interfering with their discretion.48
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, arguing that although the Fourteenth
Amendment affords defendants "an opportunity to contest the reasonableness"
of such awards, it does not provide a guarantee that the amount of a damage
award will be reasonable.49
The effect that the Gore guidelines will have on the frequency and the
amount of punitive damages awards remains to be seen. Perhaps the
uneasiness of those concerned with the constitutionality of the current process
for awarding punitive damages has been best expressed by Justice O'Connor,
a recurrent dissenter in recent Court decisions where the Court has addressed
the issue. She claims that juries need more guidance from the courts in
making punitive damage awards.5" She has stated that although punitive
damages were fairly small and seldom awarded as recently as the 1960s, "the
frequency and size of such awards have been skyrocketing" in the past few
years. 5 ' Noting that "[t]he increased frequency and size of punitive awards
. . . has not been matched by a corresponding expansion of procedural
protection or predictability, "52 she worries that the lack of guidance for juries
in assessing punitive damages "heightens the risk that arbitrariness, passion,
or bias will replace dispassionate deliberation . . . . " In O'Connor's view,
the "skeletal guidance" provided by the courts "permits the traditional
guarantor of fairness-the jury itself-to be converted into a source of caprice
and bias,"s" thus violating the Constitution's due process guarantees.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS AN ECONOMIC INCENTIVE

Another recent topic of debate concerns the effectiveness of punitive
damages as an economic influence on organizational behavior. Scholars
question the effectiveness of punitive damages on modifying an organization's
behavior for at least two reasons. First, a jury may or may not award punitive

47. Id. at 1598.
48. See id at 1598-1603.
49. Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1993).
51. Id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ellis, supra note 16, at 2).
52. Id. at 500.
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id. at 501.
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damages in a given case, but the jury award must be based upon and supported
by evidence. Second, if the jury does award punitive damages, the amount

awarded may or may not be extremely large; however, the amount also must
be based upon evidence.5' Some legal and economic commentators suggest
that such uncertainties will serve as a positive economic incentive. According
to Professor Rustad, for example, punitive damages perform their historic
function as an effective social control device to the extent that these uncertainties frighten corporate executives. 6 In his view, the threat of punitive
damages establishes "an even playing field by depriving unethical corporations
the opportunity to gain a competitive advantage by shortchanging on
safety.""' The social policy involved is preventing a "'race to the bottom'"
that would result if firms were forced to forego safety in order to compete. 8
Therefore, "society is safer as a result."5 9
Scholars have also advanced other arguments in order to illustrate how
punitive damages function as an incentive to deter wrongful behavior." For
example, Professor Wells argues that punitive damages are appropriate in
cases where all injured persons do not file suit because of the costs or
uncertainties associated with the legal process, thus resulting in potential
liability for less than 100% of the harm caused by the corporate actor. 61 By
imposing punitive damages in this specific case, a corporate actor may be
accountable for the harm caused by choosing not to implement those safety
precautions that the enterprise would have foregone had punitive damages been
prohibited. 62
Other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of punitive damages
as a deterrent on the grounds that the penalty is indeterminate. 6 The very

55. See E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct
Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1053, 1064 (1989). For example, Chrysler won its first trial for
a defective tail latch on the issue of punitive damages in 1997 (New Mexico), but then was
assessed $250 million in punitive damages for the same defect. See Kelly Greene, How a Small
Firm Helped Win a Huge Suit, WALL ST. J., S.E., November 19, 1997, at S1.
56. Rustad, supra note 3, at 86 (arguing that fixed civil fines would not effectively deter
misconduct in Fortune 500 firms unless the fines were so large as to "paralyze small- and
medium-sized manufacturers depriving unethical corporations the opportunity to gain a
competitive advantage by shortchanging on safety.").
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems,
and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REv. 363, 377-78 (1994) (discussing the effectiveness of punitive
damages as a deterrent).
61. See Michael Wells, Comments on Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate
Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1073, 1076-77 (1989).
62. Id. at 1077.
63. See Elliott, supra note 55, at 1057; see also Ellis, supra note 16, at 52-53 ("The law of

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss2/5

8

Foster et al.: Compliance Programs: An Alternative to Punitive Damages for Corpo
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
1998]

uncertainty resulting from the broad discretion afforded juries in punitive
damage awards may lessen their effectiveness.'
According to this view,
punitive damages are an effective deterrent only if both liability and the

amount likely to be awarded are ascertainable.' This conclusion becomes
apparent because "tort law as a regulatory system depends on predictability,
so that the actions taken ex post in one case can be used by others as ex ante
incentives to guide future behavior."' Accordingly, frameworks that allow
broad discretion for assessing punitive damages, "rather than discouraging
corporate misconduct . . . may actually have the perverse effects of
decreasing economic incentives for safety, undermining individual responsibility, and encouraging business-as-usual by corporations."67 Some defendants
will overestimate both the possibility of liability and the amount of punitive
damages, while others will underestimate both possibilities, thereby failing to
guard appropriately against liability.6" Commentators also argue that punitive
damages are an inadequate deterrent because they can be passed on to
customers, shareholders, and employees.69 Other problems associated with
the effectiveness of punitive damages as a deterrent include difficulties in
determining both the likelihood of claims and liability and the threshold cost
that would deter a firm. 0
V.

ISSUES IN IDENTIFYING EGREGIOUS BEHAVIOR BY A FIRM

Punitive damage proponents assume that firms are aware of their own
egregious behavior such that they should refrain from such behavior. 7
While this assumption perhaps is generally true, firms often are not aware of
particular dangers associated with complex products and services.72 Today,

punitive damages is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty that stems from the use of
a multiplicity of vague, overlapping terms and the extraordinary deference accorded to juries
who receive little meaningful guidance.").
64. See Elliott, supra note 55, at 1057.
65. See id. at 1057.
66. Id. But see Hurd & Zollers, supra note 4, at 203-04 (concluding that "[a]n essential
element of the deterrent function is the unpredictability of the risk [of punitive damages]").
67. Elliott, supra note 55, at 1057.
68. Ellis, supra note 16, at 57.
69. See Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2020 (1992).
70. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
72. A similar phenomenon may occur when a corporation commits what has been called
"structural crimes." See Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New
Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1979). Structural crimes exist when
egregious activity clearly has been committed, but responsible individuals cannot be identified.
These crimes usually occur in one of two patterns. In the first case, appropriately described as
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because firm structure may determine the division of tasks, a firm's awareness
of its own egregious behavior may be quite different from what it was a

century or so ago.
The concept of punitive damages evolved in Anglo-American law two

centuries ago as a means of punishing and deterring individuals in civil

cases. 3 Although the prospect of a punitive damages award may influence
an individual's behavior, firms are not necessarily analogous to individuals.
Some commentators suggest that firms are more than rational profit-seeking
enterprises and define them as entities in which various divisions and
individuals pursue their own goals which may or may not be the same as those
of the firm. 74 Because an individual's goals may be contrary to the firm's
objectives, questions exist as to whether individuals within the firm are
deterred by the prospect of punitive damages against the firm. As a result of
the different incentives that may influence an individual's behavior, firm
deterrence mechanisms may not effectively deter an individual within the firm
from engaging in inappropriate behavior. For example, a manager may
knowingly violate safety or environmental regulations to further personal
career goals. 75

a "good faith" failure, a victim cannot identily the responsible individual because no one acted
in a willful or wanton manner. Id. at 359. Yet, if a corporation chose not to test for the risk of
harm because the corporation expected to find a problem, then the corporation's inaction may
in fact be reckless, making punitive damages appropriate. In the second case, individuals may
have acted egregiously, but a thorough investigation does not disclose the identity of the
responsible individuals. In this scenario, the structural composition of the organization has
arguably allowed the "culpable parties to shield their guilt" from those seeking redress. Id. The
first case is a result of the organization's failure to hold particular individuals accountable for
particular tasks, decisions, and responsibilities, while the second case is a result of systemic
deficiencies in either the transmission of information or the delegation of responsibility. Id.
73. See Owen, supra note 13, at 1262-64. Difficulties exist in trying to apply punitive
damages designed to punish individual behavior to organizational standards. Professor Owen
illustrates this proposition by explaining that an individual is responsible when operating an
automobile in such a way that knowingly could kill or injure others. However, liability does
not necessarily accrue because automobiles are designed with the knowledge that they will kill
or injure. Id. at 1257, 1262-64; Owen, supra note 5, at 16; see also Fred L. Rush, Jr.,
Corporate Probation: Invasive Techniques For Restructuring Institutional Behavior, 21
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 33, 42 (1987) ("An employee's act may be guided by purely personal
monetary gain and may involve bribery, pay-backs, or crimes of financial concealment.
Furthermore, the employee's motivation may be purely political, designed to garner praise and
promotion from superiors, admiration from peers, or to sabotage a rival's career."). Because
corporations are not "unitary rational actors," managers and employees may act on personal
factors totally unrelated to factors that a finn considers in maximizing profits. Id.
74. See, e.g., Wray, supranote 69, at 2020 (calling the corporate offender "a complex entity
in which subunits, auxiliary divisions, and middle managers pursue their own 'subgoals').
75. Id. But cf. Rush, supra note 73, at 43 (stating that some economists advocate imposing
internal sanctions in order to align individual behavior with firm standards).
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A second problem is that liability is sometimes not determined until years
after the responsible persons move either to other positions within the firm in
question or to other firms.7" That is, decision-makers responsible for a
product that results in the firm incurring punitive damages liability may no
longer be present or making decisions involving products at the time the jury
awards punitive damages to the victim.' Thus, the enterprise may reason that
no corrective response is necessary because the responsible individuals are no
longer associated with the firm.
Third, in a corporate enterprise, the firm's structure may prevent a victim
from attributing egregious behavior to a particular person.78 Numerous
persons in different positions within the firm may contribute to the particular
end decision challenged years later in a courtroom as egregious.79 In a
products liability case, if questions of defectiveness arise, the combination of
persons responsible for the defect may be unclear. 0 Top management, though
ultimately responsible, may not in fact have exercised sufficient care to
become informed of potential dangers associated with the design, manufacturing, or labeling of a product, because they assumed that individuals at lower
levels would address liability issues. Similarly, those performing the design,
manufacturing, and labeling processes may not have considered the dangers
or liabilities that could result from such damages, perhaps assuming that such
considerations were the responsibility of top management."1 Further, given

76. See Elliott, supra note 55, at 1063; Owen, supra note 5, at 14 (questioning the fairness
of punishing firms "for decisions that were made.., by men and women who since have left

the company and perhaps this life") (citation omitted).
77. See Elliott, supra note 55, at 1063; see also Owen, supra note 5, at 15 ("[E]ven the
responsible executive at the end of the decisional linecan possess only a small bit of the total
information involved. Moreover, the corporate owners of the enterprise are usually far removed
from most decisions of even the top executives.").
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Standards For OrganizationalProbation: A Proposalto
the United States Sentencing Commission, 10 WHrrrIER L. REv. 77, 79 (1988). Individuals
within an organization may not be deterred by those factors that deter an organization because
they "are subject to different pressures and incentives and for personal reasons may cause their
organization to act illegally, even when it is not in the organization's rational interest (narrowly
conceived) to do so." Id.
79. See Owen, supra note 5, at 15 stating:
When [punitive damages are applied] to the complex bureaucracy of a
modem manufacturing concern, the fit is awkward in many respects. Final
'decisions' concerning a complex product are often the result of a
splintered, bureaucratic process involving a complicated combination of
human judgments made by scores of persons at different levels in the
hierarchy who pass on different aspects of the problem at different times.
80. See Note, supra note 72, at 357 (observing that the organizational complexity of large
corporations "tends to diffuse and to obscure individual responsibility for corporate actions").
81. See id. at 358; see also supra note 72 (defining "structural crimes" as instances where
organizational culpability exists, but no individual or group of individuals can be identified as
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turnover, promotions, changing job assignments, and a constantly evolving
organizational structure, corporate firms may not be able to identify changes
that need to be made to avoid liability for punitive damages.82 In the worst
case scenario, the firm's management may no longer include anyone who was
involved in the initial decision that has since resulted in an award of punitive
damages against the firm.' Thus, the prospect of liability for punitive
damages may not necessarily amount to an effective disincentive due to the
nature of a firm's present structure.'
VI. PROPOSALS TO MODIFY THE PUNiIVE DAMAGES PROCESS
In response to the dissatisfaction and controversy over the punitive
damages process, commentators have proposed and considered an array of
measures to modify the process.' For example, an American Law Institute
(ALI) Study found that the vagueness and uncertainty inherent in the current
process of awarding punitive damages have a detrimental influence on
American enterprise, discouraging development of new products and
encouraging withdrawal of others from the market. 6 The ALI Study
recommended that "reckless disregardfor the safety of others" should be the
standard utilized for determining liability for punitive damages, 8 although
critics have claimed that such a standard would not significantly aid juries in
identifying behavior that is egregious.8 8 The ALI Study also recommended
that "'clear and convincing evidence'" be the burden of proof utilized by juries
in assessing punitive damages. 9 The American Bar Association and the
American College of Trial Lawyers have also recommended that the burden

responsible).
82. See Elliott, supra note 55, at 1063.
83. See id. at 1063; supra note 72 and accompanying text.
84. Cf Note, supranote 72, at 363 (noting that because corporate fines do not directly affect
corporate actors or result in any restructuring by managers, corporate fines are not an effective
incentive to modify existing behavior).
85. See Owen, supra note 60, at 400-13 (cataloging reforms to the doctrine of punitive
damages).
86. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note I, at 265.
87. 2 A.L.I., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY:
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 248 (1991) [hereinafter A.L.I.
REPORTERS' STUDY]. "'Reckless disregard' should involve both conscious advertence to the
risks in question... and gross deviation from the appropriate standard of care." Id.
88. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 1, at 267; see also Owen, supra note 13, at 1283 n.135
("[A]ny definition of the punishable conduct, such as marketing a product in 'reckless'..
disregard of the public safety will necessarily be quite vague.").
89. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 1, at 268 (quoting A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra
note 87, at 249).
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of proof be raised to the "clear and convincing evidence" standard.' In
addition, the United States Supreme Court, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, favorably noted the requirement of some states that a plaintiff
meet an increased burden of proof in order to obtain punitive damages. 9,
With respect to admissibility of evidence, the ALI Study recommended
that a court should no longer allow introduction of evidence concerning the
wealth of a defendant firm; instead, a jury should consider only the profits
earned attendant to the particular controversy in question.' Because a firm
may be comprised of several subsidiaries with activities wholly unrelated to
the particular controversy, considering the wealth of the entire enterprise
would be unfair to employees, shareholders, and customers of the -unrelated
subsidiaries.' ALI Study recommendations also included having the jury

consider punitive damages in a proceeding separate from the proceeding in
which it determines liability for compensatory damages' and giving the judge
primary responsibility for determining the amount of the award once the jury
determines that punitive damages are appropriate.95
Although punitive damages are not awarded as part of the criminal
process, the deterrent and punishment objectives of punitive damages are
analogous to those of criminal fines. 9 Alternative measures traditionally
used in the criminal process, such as equity fimes and pass-through fines,9"
could be applied in the civil law context by requiring a transgressing firm to
issue stock to the state in lieu of paying punitive damages to the plaintiff.
Professor Coffee has proposed that firms assessed fines in criminal proceedings should be required to issue to the state the number of shares of stock

90. Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 1, at 269 & n.24; Hurd & Zollers, supra note 4, at 204.
91. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.l 1 (1990). The Court concluded,
however, that the Due Process Clause probably does not require that such a high standard of
proof be met in order to merit an award of punitive damages. Id.
92. A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 87, at 254-55. But see Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that any limitation must be made on a case-by-case basis because the
"'cquantum... of pecuniary fines neither can, nor ought to be, ascertained by any invariable
law ... what is ruin to one man's fortune, may be a matter of indifference to another's'
(quoting 4 Blackstone *371)).
93. A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 92, at 254-55.
94. Id. at 255 n.41.
95. Id. at 256.
96. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul To Damn No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 388 (1981); Owen,
supra note 60, at 382 ("Punitive damages are in the nature of criminal fines, yet defendants are
not afforded the usual safeguards of criminal procedure, particularly the benefit of a higher
burden of proof.").
97. See id. at 413.
98. See Rush, supra note 73, at 48.
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equivalent to the fine assessed by the court. The state would then turn the
shares over to victim compensation funds for sale on the open market."
Pass-through fines present another potential form of corporate punishment."° The fines "assess each shareholder a fixed, pro rata share of the
fine. The market value of the shareholders' equity establishes the fine's ceiling."101 Pass-through fines are similar to equity fines, in that they prevent
"overspill" on employees, creditors, and option holders.1 2 They offer
additional benefits because calculation of the fines does not involve determining their effect on the solvency of the firm or suppression of stock prices. 03
Perhaps most importantly, by imposing pass-through fines, "the judge can
target the fine to those who are record holders at the time of the infraction,
Whereas
4 the cash and equity fines cannot exclude innocent current holders. " 10
In addition to these proposals, over half of the states have adopted laws
to reform the way in which courts assess punitive damages. 05 These statutes
vary in approach, although all seek to curb perceived abuses from the current
punitive damages process." ° For example, some states limit the amount of
the award, while others require that a percentage of the award be paid to the
state in order to prevent the plaintiffs from receiving a windfall."1 7 Still
others require a plaintiff to meet an increased burden of proof to obtain
punitive damages or provide that liability for punitive damages and the amount
of the award should be determined at separate trials.,t' 8 Although reforms of
this type are popular with the business community and tort reform advocates,
critics charge that such measures are undesirable as a matter of public policy
because they "clearly have the effect of eliminating or significantly diminishing the deterrence function of awarding punitive damages .... ."109

99. Coffee, supra note 96, at 413. Issuing stock to the state effectively replaces monetary
fines with equity fines, thus avoiding the shifting of corporate penalties to consumers and
employees and allowing courts to impose greater penalties on the firm. Id.
100. See Rush, supra note 73, at 48.
101. Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 4, at 195; Owen, supra note 60, at 407-12 (summarizing
the common reforms to punitive damages).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 195-96.
108. Id. at 196-97. WRIGHT & MILLER 9 FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 2390 (1971); see Jack B.
Weinstein, Routine Bifurcationof Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use
of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 840-44 (1961); see also supra notes 87-95
(discussing A.L.I. STUDY).
109. Id. at 197; See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 4, at 195 (noting that "there is insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that there . . . is even a serious problem in the area of punitive
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In fact, tort reform critics can voice the same argument about the current
proposals to modify the punitive damages process. Current proposals may or

may not influence or alter firm behavior-perhaps the most important objective
of punitive damage awards from a public policy viewpoint. Although such
proposals may limit the circumstances where liability for such damages will
arise, they would not obligate or require a defendant firm to alter its behavior.
While a reasonable person might expect firms to alter their behavior in order
to mitigate the risk of such liability, the firms' internal mechanisms would
continue to control the impetus to change. Even if a firm elected to modify its
behavior to avoid future liability, the reform proposals do not provide
guidelines, checklists, or models to assist the corporation in modifying its
present processes.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES

As noted above, a firm's initial design, manufacturing, and marketing is
probably unaffected by the threat of punitive damages."1 However, allowing
punitive damages to be awarded excessively may stifle the provision of goods
and services desired by consumers, thereby reducing economic benefits
generated by commercial enterprise. 1 Limiting punitive damages may
reduce the stifling effect that the perceived threat of unlimited potential
financial liability may have on the research and development of new
products.112 Yet, this approach may leave consumers at risk should an
environment result in which they are exposed continuously to potentially
dangerous services and products. After all, consumers are dependent on
manufacturers to design and produce products that are not defective and to
communicate, via instructions and labeling, information that will minimize the
danger of injury. Therefore, limits on punitive damages might lead to an
increase of dangerously defective products.
Punitive damages proponents assume that damages will deter or minimize
the incidence of egregious behavior in the future.1' Imposing punitive
damages does in fact penalize; however, these damages may not necessarily

damages").
110. See Elliott, supranote 55, at 1061; see supra Part V.
111. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 1, at 265.
112. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

113. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 3, at 86 ("To the extent that the [indeterminate amount of
punitive damages] frightens corporate executives, it performs its historic function as an effective
social control device."). But see, e.g., Elliott, supra note 55, at 1059 ("[A]t least in the area of
corporate decisions in products liability and other safety-related fields, there is no credible
evidence that punitive damages have a substantial deterrent effect.").
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deter." 4 To meet their objectives, reform proponents should institute a
triggering process that will encourage corporations to modify or transform
their behavior. 5 Yet, absent some requirement that firms analyze and
restructure their organizations, behavior may not change. While the award of
punitive damages signals inappropriate behavior, such awards neither
communicate to the corporations what behavior is appropriate nor provide
guidance on how to move toward appropriate behavior. Simply awarding
punitive damages fails to focus on the primary objective of the remedy:
behavior modification. An award of punitive damages should trigger an
organizational analysis; however, requiring firms to pay large sums of money
may lead only to the demise of the firm or to the maintenance of the status
1 16
quo, neither of which is the desired result.
In some jurisdictions, courts are granted discretion both to impose
damages and to provide guidance for wayward organizations. For example, a
court, applying antitrust law, may choose to correct the behavior of a firm that

has engaged in unreasonable restraint of trade by imposing both a damages
award and equitable remedies. 7 Likewise, if a court finds that a firm has
engaged in other types of egregious behavior, the court should be able to
subject the firm to equitable remedies to ensure that the firm's future behavior
118
will be more appropriate.
In sum, punitive damages are not the best manner in which to encourage
a change in behavior. Something more is required to assure that the public
interest is protected. In addition to requiring corporations to pay punitive
'damages, perhaps courts could require corporate defendants to analyze their
organizations' procedures and to modify those processes that result in
increased risk of injury to their product users. In this manner, a court may
effectively ensure that risks to the consumers will be reduced as a direct result
of a change in corporate behavior.

114. Elliott, supra note 55, at 1059.
115. See Note, supra note 72, at 361 ("Rehabilitating a corporation requires that its internal
operations and procedures be restructured in such a way as to foster future compliance with the
law; institutional elements that facilitated the commission of an offense must be modified so that
they operate subsequently to prevent violations.").
116. Judicial intervention requiring restructuring may create more efficient results than punitive
damages. First, restructuring can modify the internal structural elements that resulted in liability
initially. Second, judicial intervention reduces the burden placed on innocent parties such as
shareholders and consumers. However, inefficient burdens on the time and resources of the
judicial system must be remedied. The courts could use special masters who are paid by the
offending corporation to design and implement compliance programs. See id. at 365.
117. Equitable remedies are permitted under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-12
(1994), as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
118. See Note, supra note 72, at 365-67 (discussing the merits of judicial intervention in
internal corporate processes as a means of deterring corporate crime).
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VIII. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

As analysis of the deterrent effect of criminal penalties on firm behavior
has led Congress to enact statutory provisions authorizing compliance
programs as a means of deterring criminal behavior," 9 the authors propose
that a similar program be designed to deter inappropriate firm behavior in civil
cases in lieu of, or as an alternative to, punitive damage awards. Compliance
programs are frameworks developed and implemented by an enterprise for the
purpose of monitoring and modifying employee behavior to minimize the
incidence of criminal conduct. 2 ' Because a primary objective of punitive
damages in civil law is to deter inappropriate behavior, compliance programs
should be considered as an alternative to punitive damages.
Federal sentencing guidelines authorize courts to require transgressing
firms to devise and implement compliance programs both to minimize and
modify inappropriate behavior. 2 ' If compliance programs are a suitable
remedy for criminal violations, then they should also be suitable to remedy
egregious behavior in the civil law context. A compliance program, designed
to modify the firm's wrongful conduct, offers the possibilities of rescuing and
reforming an entity so that it may become a more positive contributor to
society. Moreover, the cost of devising, implementing, and monitoring a
compliance program-a cost thrust upon the firm-may serve as an additional
deterrent to the defendant and other firms," thereby reducing the risk of
similar inappropriate behavior in the future. "
An array of precedent exists where courts and federal agencies have
required that firms engage in structural modification. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 requires certain corporations to "devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide" specified
information. 24 In United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., ' 5 the court

119. See generally Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, CorporateCompliance Programsas a
Defense to CriminalLiability: Can a CorporationSave Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605,
610-632 (1995) (explaining the history, theories, and rationales behind corporate liability).
120. See id. at 645-649 and sources cited therein.
121. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.2 (1995) [hereinafter SENTENCING
GUIDELINES] (authorizing remedial programs to remedy the present harm and to reduce the risk
of future harm).
122. See Steven A. Holmes, Size of Texaco DiscriminationSettlement CouldEncourageMore
Lawsuits, N.Y. TImS, Nov. 17, 1996, at A20 (noting that Texaco's large settlement "is bound
to capture the attention of executives, who may want to review their companies' employment
practices").
123. For example, the NAACP and other civil rights advocates believe that Texaco's voluntary
program to restructure its relationship with its minority employees may serve as a model for other
corporations to follow. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
124. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1994).
125. 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972).
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found that Atlantic Richfield was engaging in illegal pollution by discharging
oil into navigable waters from one of its dock facilities. 126 In an attempt to
modify behavior and attain compliance, the Seventh Circuit suspended the
statutory sentence requiring a fine and gave Atlantic Richfield sixty days to
develop and implement a program to resolve the pollution problem. 27 In
SEC v. Koenig" the Second Circuit approved a designated receiver to
analyze and assist the Ecological Science Corporation in complying with SEC
regulations. Because the SEC's investigation revealed questionable activities
that Ecological Science Corporation appeared unable or unwilling to confront,
the court protected both the public's and the stockholders' interests by

requiring that a receiver be appointed.' 2 9 In Hart v. Community School
30

Board' a federal district judge required that a plan be implemented to
address a junior high school's racial imbalance. 1' The district judge ordered
all parties with interest in the district's educational system to submit plans3 2
and appointed a special master to assist the parties in preparing the plan. 133
After the parties had submitted a variety of plans, the special master held
hearings and eventually adopted a plan making the school a magnet facility
with a 70-to-30 ratio of white to minority students as an enrollment target.' 34
Other examples of court-ordered programs aimed at influencing behavior
include requiring a bakery to donate fresh baked goods to designated charitable
organizations135 and requiring three large corporations both to donate the
services of certain high-level executives to charity for one year and to make
36
financial contributions to that same charity. 1
In 1973 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) departed from
the usual punishment of expelling or suspending accounting firms from
practice, finding such punitive measures ineffective to modify firm practices.

126. Id. at 59.
127. Id. at 61 n.1; see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 185 (1975) (discussingAtlantic Richfield's premonition that
court-imposed probation would start a "dangerous trend in the law").
128. 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
129. Id. at 202; see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir.
1972) (upholding the appointment of a trustee to ensure that financial activities were consistent
with SEC requirements).
130. 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aft'd,
512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
131. Id. at 754-58.
132. Id. at 756-58.
133. Id. at 767.
134. Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 383 F.Supp. 769, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
135. See United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
136. See United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1982)
(expressing concern that corporate defendants could "'just write a check and walk away'" from
any injury that they caused).
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Instead, the SEC issued an order requiring the firm to follow designated
procedures fashioned under SEC supervision.'37 In addition, the accounting
firm agreed to permit an inspection team from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants to visit the firm and to report on compliance with
the agreed-upon procedures. 3 '
These examples illustrate a variety of creative alternatives to traditional

punishment, each of which involves the conception, development, and
implementation of plans designed to influence the behavior of an organization
in a specific manner.
However, questions exist about reducing punitive damages when a
manufacturer subsequently modifies a warning label. In O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 139 the plaintiff asserted a strict liability tort claim in
federal district court in Kansas. Plaintiff alleged that his wife's use of Playtex
tampons caused her to develop toxic shock syndrome, a condition that
ultimately led to her death." The jury found that Playtex failed to adequately warn of the risk of toxic shock from using the tampon and awarded $1.5
million in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages.' 4 '
After judgment and apparently at the behest of the trial court, Playtex
announced that it was modifying its product warning and implementing a
program that would alert the public to the dangers of toxic shock syndrome. 142 In response to this post-trial announcement, the trial court reduced
punitive damages to $1.35 million. 143 Plaintiff appealed, claiming that the
trial court abused its discretion. 144
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that remittitur is
proper only where the "amount of damages awarded is so excessive that it
shocks the judicial conscience."145 Absent such a finding, the jury's award
should not be disturbed. Applying this standard, the court of appeals found
that the trial court was without the authority to reduce the punitive award. The
defendant's state of mind at the time of the injury, rather than the defendant's
mitigating conduct subsequent to the injury,'46 that is the important factor in

137. LaventholAgrees to Allow Review by Fellow CPAs, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1973, at 7;
see also STONE, supra note 127, at 185-86 (discussing the Laventhol punishment).
138. Laventhol Agrees to Allow Review by Fellow CPAs, supra note 137.
139. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
140. Id. at 1440.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1441.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1448. The trial judge at post-trial hearing reported that sufficient
evidence existed to support the jury verdict. Id.
146. Id. at 1449.
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determining whether punitive damages are appropriate. 47 Upholding the
reduction of punitive damages based on good faith of the defendant subsequent
to the misfortune would "discourage voluntary cessation of injury-causing
conduct." 4 ' If such reductions are allowed, firms will reserve good faith
conduct as a bargaining tool to reduce punitive damages instead of voluntarily
implementing compliance programs.'49 Playtex modified its warning label
without engaging in a comprehensive examination of the decision making with
the objective of minimizing conduct that could result in future punitive
damages.
IX. DESIGN OF THE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

Compliance programs are hardly a strange phenomena to large American
firms. Corporations often initiate voluntary compliance programs to shield
themselves from liability or to settle pending claims.'s ° For example, to
settle a race discrimination suit brought by some of its employees, Texaco
recently agreed to pay $140 million in damages and to both develop and
implement a comprehensive program to restructure its relationship with its
minority employees.' Among other provisions, the plan requires Texaco
to pay ten percent salary increases to its minority employees. In addition,
Texaco's management was asked to appoint a task force that will revise the
company's personnel policies by developing new hiring and promotion

procedures, creating diversity and sensitivity training programs for the
company's managers, and establishing a mentoring program. 5 Although the
settlement agreement was "voluntary" and not the result of a court order, it
is the type of plan a court should have the authority to require a firm to devise
and comply with in order to redress reprehensible conduct in lieu of requiring
them to pay punitive damages.'
Perhaps the most important objective of a compliance program is to
minimize the kind of conduct that subjects the firm to awards of punitive
damages. 54 The firm should design a compliance plan structured to fit the

147. Id.
148. Id. at 1450.
149. Id. at 1449.
150. See, e.g., KurtEichenwald, Texaco to Make Record Payoutin Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1996, at Al (discussing the terms of the settlement as well as Texaco's additional
concessions).
151. Id.
152. Id; Holmes, supra note 122, at A20.
153. Indeed, Texaco's desire to avoid liability for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 likely sparked its willingness to enter into such a large settlement. See Holmes, supra
note 122.
154. See Jeffrey M. Kaplan et al., Living with the OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, 36
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needs of its own particular organization such that the provisions of the
program will prevent and detect misconduct.155 From the plan's inception,
personnel at the highest level should be responsible for the evolution and
implementation of the program. The Board of Directors and top management
should publicly make a commitment to the plan. Both internal and external
overseers should participate in the development and implementation of the
plan. This form of oversight should focus on the processes for determining the
parameters of legal responsibility and for identifying the particular individuals

and organizational components responsible for the improper behavior. For
example, in a products liability case, the firm should first identify those
persons responsible for the inadequate design and then require them to
redesign the product more safely and to communicate the nature of the bad
design and its cure to others in the organization. Likewise, management
should require persons in manufacturing and labeling to identify and cure any
failures in their legal responsibilities and should require them to communicate
potential problems to the appropriate person. Thus, senior management will
become aware of both the potential dangers and the relevant legal issues
concerning those dangers. Such a plan would address problems that might
arise when senior management and those at lower levels would otherwise
assume that another person will address these risks. Agents and outside
consultants with legal and organizational expertise should participate in the
process to ensure that risks are addressed appropriately. Furthermore, the
organization should compare itself to other firms in the industry and analyze
how these other firms are satisfying their legal obligations.
Suppose that a firm has recklessly manufactured and sold or distributed
unreasonably dangerous products and been found liable for punitive damages.
In this case, the plan for the compliance program might provide for the
following:
1. The company first should identify employees responsible for the
egregious conduct and require them to announce precisely what they
did wrong and why what they did was wrong. Next, the company
should conduct an ongoing assessment of risks attendant to product
design, including monitoring industry and technological developments
to ensure that the firm design process is consistent with the latest
developments.

CAL. MGmT. REV. 136, 144 (1993) (discussing internal compliance programs).
155. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 121, § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k); cf. Richard S. Gruner,
Beyond Fines: Innovative CorporateSentences Under FederalSentencing Guidelines,71 WASH.
U. L.Q. 261, 294 (1993) (recognizing that courts can meet both punitive and remedial goals by
designing programs that will impact "corporate reputations" and offer "remedial benefits").
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2. The company should monitor and compare the firm's manufacturing
process to others used in the industry to ensure that the company's
quality control mechanisms indicate when its products will not meet
safety specifications.
3. The company should implement a process to ensure that the labeling
and instructions communicate adequate information so that consumers
will use the product for its intended purpose. In addition, the company
should attempt to determine possible inappropriate uses and should
warn the consumers about the inappropriate usage. Finally, the
company should periodically update the labeling and instructions to
ensure safe use. This process might consist of an ongoing assessment
of possible consumer misuses throughout the design and manufacturing process as well as a review of competitors' products.
4. The company should solicit feedback from customers, lower level
employees, and trade association or professional association personnel. This communication should be continuous and ongoing to ensure
that the firm is operating at the forefront with respect to innovations
and technological developments.
5. Management should assign responsibility on a firm-wide basis in order
to satisfy local, state, and federal regulatory requirements. In addition,
the firm should question the effectiveness of existing regulations and
should seek to improve the regulatory process, particularly when

public and consumer safety concerns are at issue.
6. To the extent that installation, maintenance, or other services are
offered, the company should include processes to train the personnel
and to make sure that they are acting in accordance with professional
standards. If employees utilize equipment to render services, a
training process should inform the employees as to the appropriate use
and maintenance of the equipment.
Obviously, the firm must take adequate steps to ensure that the employees
will follow the implemented program. To this end, the plan for the compliance
program might provide for some or all of the following:
1. The firm will disseminate to every employee a printed copy of the
compliance program. 5 6 Personnel at the highest level should also
orally communicate the provisions to as many employees as possible
to stress the importance of compliance and to ensure the cooperation
7
5

of the employees.'

156. See Kaplan et al., supra note 154, at 139.
157. See id.
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2. High-level personnel should assign responsibility for compliance with
various provisions to appropriate divisions of lower-level employ58

ees.1

3. The firm should schedule regular feedback sessions so that employees
at all levels can provide feedback regarding compliance with the plan.
In addition, the firm should maintain written minutes of these sessions
in order to compile a sufficiently detailed record of the firm's ongoing
compliance efforts.
4. Specially-designated employees of the firm should monitor the firm's
compliance efforts and should periodically report the results of the
program to a court-appointed special master. These reports should
continue for the duration of the compliance program.
5. The monitors of the program should assess compliance violations in
order to determine whether they reflect either an enterprise morale
problem or deficiencies in the process. Additional auditing and
monitoring systems should "enabl[e] employees to report suspected
violations without fear of retribution. "159
6. The plan should also include a process whereby it can be modified or
updated in appropriate situations; however, material changes should
require court approval.
In addition to monitoring compliance, the plan should set forth a system
of discipline to ensure that the compliance process functions effectively, 6 °
designating appropriate penalties for failure to participate or act in accordance
with the process in the compliance plan.16' Although a system of discipline
and an effort by top management to communicate the importance of the plan
to all employees are important for the program to be effective, the program's
success will ultimately hinge on the commitment that top management
demonstrates to the program, including its willingiiess to discipline those who
fail to act consistently with the plan. 162
In addition to or as part of the compliance program, a court may require
a firm found to have engaged in egregious conduct to perform remedial
community service. 63 Provisions in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide
for that possibility in criminal cases where the defendant organization

158. Likewise, management should carefully assign responsibility only to those employees who
are unlikely to engage in misconduct. Id. at 140.
159. Id. at 140-41; see also Kaplan et al., supra note 154, at 141 & n.24 (discussing the
consideration a corporation should make when encouraging employees to report suspected
violations).
160. Id. at 141-42.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 139-40.
163. See United States v. MitsubishiInt'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982).
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possesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify organization
personnel to repair damage caused by the offense."
Along these lines, firm requirements might include: (1) mandatory
publication of a corporate offender's past inappropriate behavior to encourage
heightened monitoring of subsequent corporate behavior in private relation(2) design and implementation of a court-supervised compliance
ships;
program;" and (3) additional compulsory reforms in compliance practices
which would reduce the likelihood of inappropriate conduct in the future.16 7
A compliance program should be a preventive tool.' 68 Once a compliance program is in place, it should have a "self-correcting effect" on the
propriety of how a firm conducts its business.'69 Compliance programs may
be even more effective when successful compliance, as determined by the
court, will reduce or eliminate the firm's obligation to pay punitive damages.
X.

CONCLUSION

Agreement exists that the settlement process is a necessary response to an
increasing number of controversies that, because of numbers of parties or
nature of issues, do not lend themselves to usual trial court process. 7 ' The
settlement process offers innovative and creative possibilities in response to
disputes, but at a cost of uncertainty of process and procedure that can raise
questions of fairness and due process.17 ' The exact nature of a plan cannot
be known in advance. The role of a master should be defined, and judges

164. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 121, § 8B1.3 commentary.
165. See id. at § 8D1.4(a); Andrew Cowan, ScarletLettersforCorporations? Punishmentby
Publicity Under the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CALIF. L. REv. 2387 (1992); Andrea A.
Curico, PainfulPublicity-An Alternative PunitiveDamages Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 341
(1996).

166. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
167. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 121, at § 8D1.1 (explaining conditions and
enforcement of probation).
168. See Robert J.Rafalko, Remaking the Corporation:The 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
13 J. Bus. ETHICS 625, 627 (1994).
169. Id. While this article analyzes the steps for implementing a corporate compliance program
under the 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the authors conclude with two points, both of which
may apply to the creation of a compliance program in the punitive damages context. First, a set
of guidelines will insure that a firm serves the needs of society in a responsible manner by
producing desired products and services and by generating profits and returns on capital. Id. at
634. Second, guidelines will assist employees in maintaining their "ethical integrity" as they
attempt to serve the corporation. Id.
170. See Wayne D. Brazil, SpecialMasters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciaryor
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394, 410-14 (1986).
171. See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judgesin Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 362 (1986).
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should not abdicate to masters."r

Fairness will be best addressed if the

parties, their attorneys, the judge, and masters or other appointed experts are
all actively involved in the settlement process.173
As proposed, compliance programs should not pose the broad array of
uncertainties that may be incidental to a settlement process. Generally, a court
should not implement compliance programs until after a trial court proceeding
where findings of fact and application of law have resulted in a decision
finding the defendant's behavior to be egregious. If the court finds the
development of a compliance program appropriate, the defendant must carry
the burden both of developing and of presenting a proposed plan to the court
for approval. A master or other expert may be utilized in this process.
Further, the proposed guidelines for developing and implementing a compliance program provide a pre-existing format that often does not exist to guide
the initial stages of a settlement process.
Due to concerns that punitive damage awards are frequently unfair and
detrimental to the economic well-being of a commercial enterprise, numerous
reform efforts are currently underway to better define the process for
determining punitive damages, including limiting amounts that a plaintiff may
receive. By decreasing deterrence, ongoing reform efforts by Congress and the
states to limit punitive damages will increase the need for other measures to
modify inappropriate firm behavior. Although limitations on dollar liability
minimize the potential financial harm that an enterprise may experience, these
limitations are likely to decrease the probability that firms will modify
inappropriate behavior likely to result in harm to others, because the incentives
to avoid inappropriate behavior are reduced.
In contrast, limitations on punitive damages provide more certainty when
a firm factors its risk calculations, creating an opportunity for the firm to
analyze liability as an economic issue rather than a social issue. Limitations
on punitive damages and the subsequent failure to address inappropriate
behavior may invite public demand for new sanctions that may be at least as
burdensome as the liability for punitive damages from which corporations are
attempting to escape.
Compliance programs could help offset the decreased deterrence brought
about by abandoning punitive damages. Because a primary public policy
objective of imposing punitive damages is to deter future inappropriate
behavior, compliance programs could serve as a viable alternative to punitive
damages. They offer an opportunity to create an organizational structure that
would not only modify firm behavior but might also serve as a model that

172. See Brazil, supra note 170, at 417-20.
173. See Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 446-447 (1986). But see Shuck, supra note 171, at 359-365
(cautioning against judicial over-involvement).
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other organizations could follow in order to minimize the incidence of their
own inappropriate behavior.
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